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Abstract. The movement of immigrants is simulated by using a spatial
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with move option. We explore the eect of
collective behavior in an evolutionary migrating dynamics. Simulation
results show that immigrants adopting collective strategy perform better
and thus gain higher survival rate than those not. This research suggests
that the clustering of immigrants promotes cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Competition and cooperation are two ubiquitous and inalienable actions in na-
ture [20]. How cooperation evolves in a population of self-interest individuals is
an important longstanding scientic question in both biology and social sciences.
A powerful framework which has been used frequently to investigate these prob-
lems is evolutionary game theory, which includes the changing strategy adoption
of a single agent, leading to the concept of rounds [19].
The most relevant game models are two-player games where two players
choose to either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payo of a player depends on
the choices of both sides. There are four possible payos in total. Both two players
will get a reward (R) if they both choose to cooperate while a punishment (P ) will
be given if they both choose to defect. In the situation where one player chooses
to cooperate whereas the other player chooses to defect. A temptation reward
(T ) will be given to the defector, whereas the cooperator will get the suckers
punishment (S). Dierent ranking about the above four values determines what
game they are playing. In PD game, four values are set as T > R > P > S. In
terms of these inequalities, it is clear that defection is dominant: every player is
better o to choose defect whatever the other player chooses. This makes mutual
defection to be a stable strategy in a well-mixed population. There are two other
relevant social dilemma games with PD [10]. The rst game is called Chicken [15]
? These authors contributed equally to this work
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or Snowdrift (SD) with a rank as T > R > S > P . A reasonable explanation is
that in most animal contests, mutual defection will lead to the worst consequence
for both players where the loss even exceeds the cost of being exploited. Another
game is called Stag Hunt (SH) [3]. The rank set in this game is R > T > P > S,
which means the reward of cooperation surpasses the temptation. An example of
this situation is that when disasters or powerful enemies occur, it is meaningless
to still defect other self-interested agents. In the next part of the introduction,
evolutionary games with spatial structure will be discussed.
Unlike classical evolutionary game theory which considers the population
of players as randomly mixed, a spatial game model puts all players into a
two-dimensional lattice, allowing them to continuously interact with their di-
rect neighbors. This spatial structure simulates strategic interactions in the real
world, where individuals are placed in certain locations, not move far away from
their birthplace and only interact with their relatively xed neighbors [8]. In
each generation of a spatial PD game, every player will play a series of two-
player PD games with all its neighbors (Moore neighborhood is commonly used
here, which indicates the players in eight direct-linked sites) and accumulate the
payo. At the end of each generation, each player will compare its payo with all
its neighbors and change its strategy, following the one with the highest payo
among them. Compared with the classical evolutionary game, the competition
in the spatial game is more complex, and it may lead to dierent but more use-
ful results. While defection dominates cooperation in PD game, the existence
of spatial structure gives cooperation the possibility of survival and grow into
clusters [13, 22]. Inside a cluster, the cooperation behavior provides its mem-
bers with enough payo to overweight the exploitation from outside defectors
[23]. In a scale-free model where strong correlations exist between individuals,
cooperation may even dominate over defection [18].
In 2007, Vainstein et al. introduced a random-walk mechanism to spatial
game model, in which each player can move to a randomly chosen empty neigh-
boring site with a probability [23]. Later, more directional migration mechanisms
were introduced. Meloni et al. studied the case where the direction of migration is
payo biased and the movement is with a certain velocity [12]. Helbing et al. in-
troduced the famous success-driven migration model, where players move to the
empty neighboring site with the highest estimated payo. In neighbor-considered
migration model [16], a new concept called fairness payo is introduced. In this
model, while players still tend to move to the sites with a higher payo, reducing
the disparity of payo among their neighbors becomes another target.
To date, there are many studies focused on the eects of mobility on the
evolution of cooperation of two or more groups(strategies) in a spatial version
of the N-player PD game. However, group cooperation in humans and animals
is common [3, 21], collective strategies also have great potential research value.
The collective strategy is a summary or a systematic name of collective be-
haviors. The concept of collective behavior traced back to Park and Burgess [14]
and Blumer [9]. It is a special kind of social interaction and refers to a group of
unorganized people who are stimulated and inuenced by a certain factor. This
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expression has been expanded to other creatures, such as cells, social animals
like birds and sh, and insects including ants [7].
Immigration is the international migration of people into a destination coun-
try in order to settle or reside there. Typical immigrants include permanent res-
idents, naturalized citizens or those who expect to be employed as a temporary
foreign worker or as a migrant worker [11]. Immense studies about inuences
brought by immigrants has been done. In terms of economic eects, research
suggests that both sending and receiving countries benet from migration [6,
1]. Furthermore, some researches drew a conclusion that immigration on aver-
age has positive economic inuences towards the native population. However,
it is unclear whether low-skilled immigrants have negative eects on low-skilled
natives [4, 2]. In conclusion, immigration is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human
societies, and it inuences many aspects of social development. Therefore, im-
migration contains a signicant value to be studied and immigration model is a
useful one chosen by many other researches. Collective behavior brings advan-
tage to the group of players who implements it. However, the performance of
collective strategy on immigrants still needs more studies. Therefore, this paper
studies if collective behavior is still powerful and how powerful it is for immi-
grants to survive in a new environment.
Though there has been a number of studies about migration and collective
strategy separately, there are few studies combine migration with collective be-
havior. In this paper, we will continue this procession of research by studying
the performance of collective strategies as immigrants in a spatial N-player PD
game with random mobility.
2 Model: a Spatial Prisoners Dilemma (SPD) with Move
Option
In the game model of this paper, some modication is done to the migration
method in order to emphasize the existence of strategic interaction. The mi-
gration method is similar with that in Schelling model, which is a long studied
mathematical model in social sciences. In Schelling model [17], a map is initial-
ized with randomly distributed agents from several groups where each group
represents a race. Each agent has an indicator of satisfaction, which value will
increase as the number of its neighbors of the same race increases. Agents are
stimulated to move if they are unsatised with their own satisfaction level. The
studies on Schelling model came out with that even a slight homophyllic bias will
lead to signicant segregation of the dierent groups of agents. Since parts of
the Schelling model corresponds to the spatial migrating PD game (for example,
the spatial structure, the interaction with the neighbors, and the migrating be-
havior), some ideas from Schelling model is applied into our game model. More
specically, similar with Schelling model, in our game model player with collec-
tive strategy will stop moving only if the number of its neighbors of same group
is equal or larger than a predened mobility.
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The game model introduced in this paper divides the player into two groups,
natives and immigrants. The numbers of players in the two groups are not equal,
while the population of natives is at least ten times more than the population
of immigrants. The tag of the two groups is visible to all players. The players
strategy may depend on its opponents group. According to Chiong and Kirley
[5] , proper move action can enhance the cooperation between immigrants when
compared with the natives who always stay at the same place. In this paper, the
eect of collective behaviour will be observed with movement, which might come
to a more conspicuous and observable result. In the game model, immigrants with
collective strategy will invade a larger group of native inhabitants. The collective
behavior is reected in two aspects. Firstly, the player with collective strategy
could identify its opponents identity; it will always cooperate with the player
from the same group and defect with the player from dierent groups. Secondly,
the player with collective strategy tends to settle down in environments where its
group dominates. A real-world example of this game model is the immigration
in human society, where the native people is hostile toward the immigrant. To
survive in the new unfriendly environment, isolated immigrants may assemble
and develop as a group. Through this study, a new game model about collective
behavior and migration is generated, which may ll some vacancy in the existing
studies.
In this section, three perspectives will be introduced and expounded: the
static rule of the game, the method under this set of rules and the experiment
settings. Key terms are explained below:
group a collection of all players using the same strategy.
native a group having a larger quantity and have a low tendency of movement.
immigrant a group having a less quantity and have a comparably higher ten-
dency of movement.
neighbor a player located near the current player. A player can have at most
eight neighbors (Moore Neighborhood).
mobility a value indicating tendency of movement of a collective strategy, in
this paper, referring to the minimum number of neighbors of same strategy
in neighborhood to activate movement. Instances of strategies with dierent
mobility can be seen in Appendix.
2.1 Rule
This model implements a spatial PD game; therefore, previous traditional studies
are referenced for the rules.
{ Every player locates in a cell of the 2D map.
{ There are 50% players on the original map.
{ Two adjacent players play a single PD game in an iteration.
{ The result of each PD game is a pair of payo value adding to scores of two
players. The score is determined according to the payo matrix in Fig. 1.
After playing with each neighbor, the score (total payo in this iteration) of
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central player will be determined. At the start of each iteration, scores of all
players will be reset to 0.
{ The game ends when no change can be made or one of the two groups
disappears.
Fig. 1. The payo matrix
In this game, several rules are set in order to evaluate and simulate the
relationship transition of two groups.
Players are allowed to move to a random nearby empty cell. The move deci-
sion is generated based on strategies.
At the end of every iteration, a player adopts the strategy of the neighbour
who has received the highest score. If two neighbours gain equal highest score,
one strategy will be chosen randomly.
The group adopts an ecient strategy dominates other groups with weak
strategy over time.
Therefore, eciency and strength of each strategy can be estimated according
to the number of players remained in evolution.
Six strategies are tested in simulations. Strategies for native players include
AllD, AllC and CS. Strategies for immigrants are AllDM, AllCM and CSM.
Details of these strategies are given in the Appendix. Dierent distribution of
initial population leads to dierent result which could be an equilibrium state
where native strategies and immigrant strategies coexist, or a homogeneous pop-
ulation In this game, the natives are supposed to stay at the location they are
and the immigrants choose whether to move based on their payos. In detail,
AllD shows the exclusiveness of the native and AllC shows the hospitality of the
native. In addition, CS probably dominate in most PD competitions that allows
players to cooperate with kin members and defects against non-kin members.
This is a strong simulation of group behaviour, which reects the characteristic
of immigrants as well. Besides, AllDM, AllCM and CSM are the same as the
three strategies above, except the movement.
To simulate the typical scenarios in the movement of immigrants, it is distinct
that immigrants represent less part of the population comparing to the native.
In addition, it is possible to develop a dierent ratio of natives and immigrants.
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Therefore, 20% and 10% are applied in the study to restore society. The rea-
son for implementing dierent ratio is to observe the inuence of the number
of players on the survival rate in spatial PD. Accordingly, a more convincing
conclusion could be drawn even though with a dierent ratio of two groups.
In our rst series of experiments, two percentages of immigrants are simulat-
ed: 20% and 10%. In those experiments, dierent ratios of players and dierent
strategies are adopted. There are 18 experiments in total. Dierent strategy
combinations are listed below.
1. Native strategy is AllD, immigrant strategies are AllDM, AllCM and CSM
respectively.
2. Native strategy is AllC, immigrant strategies are AllDM, AllCM and CSM
respectively.
3. Native strategy is CS, immigrant strategies are AllDM, AllCM and CSM
respectively.
In another series of experiments, dierent mobility levels of CSM are tested.
1. Native strategy is AllD, immigrant strategies are CSM, CSM2, CSM3 and
CSM4 respectively.
2. Native strategy is AllC, immigrant strategies are CSM, CSM2, CSM3 and
CSM4 respectively.
3. Native strategy is CS, immigrant strategies are CSM, CSM2, CSM3 and
CSM4 respectively.
3 SIMULATION RESULTS ANALYSIS
In the rst series of experiments, we focus on whether collective strategy helps
immigrants survive among natives. Firstly, three groups of tests were made, in
each group the same native strategy played against three immigrant strategies
ALLCM, ALLDM and CSM in separated simulations.
Fig. 2 shows that CSM strategy could survive in the environments full of one
of the three strategies (ALLD, ALLC, CS). In Fig. 2(a), where the native inhab-
itants take ALLD strategy, CSM not only becomes the only survival immigrant
strategy, but also reaches a high percentage in the population (about 94%) . In
Fig. 2(b), among natives of ALLC strategy, the increasing rate of CSM is as fast
as ALLDM's. The dierence between results of CSM and ALLDM is that, while
the immigrants with ALLDM strategy take the place of all native inhabitants,
the percentage of CSM strategy increased to about 90% and reached an equilib-
rium. In the games of Fig. 2(c), the native inhabitants with collective strategy
is a threat to all immigrant strategies. At the initial iterations, the percentages
of population of all immigrant strategies plummeted. However, the immigrants
with ALLDM strategy has a high rate may disappear during the plummet stage.
The CSM and ALLCM immigrants have a high probability of maintaining a low
population and surviving through the game.
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Fig. 2. Changes in immigrant population with the initial population containing 10%
immigrants.
To see if the initial percentage of immigrants will aect the process of game,
another group of games are played (the result is shown in Fig. 3), where the
initial percentage of immigrant increased from 10% to 20%. The trends of data
in Fig. 3 is generally same as that in Fig. 2, which indicates that the change of
initial population not signicantly aect the process of game.
Through these two groups of games, three discoveries are drawn. Firstly,
while ALLDM and ALLCM both failed to survive in all games, CSM success-
fully survived in all games. Though in some games, CSM could only maintain a
minimal subsistence, in majority of the games CSM led the immigrants to pros-
perity. In summary, CSM has proven its ability of surviving in SPD games with
migration. Collective strategy is still in advantage in this SPD game simulating
migration.
The second discovery is that, under most situations, though CSM could rapid-
ly reach a high population, it will get into equilibrium at that population, instead
of totally take place of the native inhabitants. This phenomenon was especially
signicant in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 3(b), where the ALLDM soon deracinated the
native inhabitants, CSM still left some living space for the native inhabitants.
Though ALLDM and CSM both take defection strategy toward the native in-
habitants, the invasion of CSM is more moderate than ALLDM. A probable
reason for this phenomenon is that at the later iterations of the game the CSM
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immigrants has reached a big population and settled down among clusters of
immigrants. According to CSM strategy, when CSM immigrants have neighbors
from the same group, they will not move around anymore. As the population
and density of CSM increases, the movability of CSM immigrants will decrease.
After the CSM immigrants formed a stable cluster, they had no more motivation
to move across some empty cells to invade the residual native inhabitants.
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Fig. 3. Changes in immigrant population with the initial population containing 20%
immigrants.
Thirdly, as Fig. 4(d) shows, the empty spaces between native inhabitants
and immigrants will segregate the two groups, preventing the residual native
inhabitants from extinction. The small cluster of native inhabitants will not
be invaded by immigrants, so the native inhabitants could still survive in an
environment where CSM immigrants prospered.
Simulating immigrants movement 9
(a) Initial population (b) A part of initial population
(c) Population in equilibrium (d) A part of nal population
Fig. 4. Simulating migration process. Green (light) cells are natives with ALLC strat-
egy. Red (dark) cells are CSM immigrants. Black cells are empty spaces. The initial
population contains 10% immigrants and 90% natives.
Moreover, there is a hypothesis that the move condition may aect the exper-
imental results in CSM. As shown in Fig. 5, CSM with dierent move conditions
are compared at the same initial ratio of immigrants. The move conditions have a
limited impact on the nal result. They inuence the nal ratio of immigrants in
equilibrium population. However, they do not determine whether an immigrant
strategy survive or not.
There are four kinds of move conditions for CS, which are when the mobility
of move is 1, 2, 3 and 4. The higher the mobility means the higher probability
of move.
In the case where natives are ALLD (Fig. 5(a)) and ALLC (Fig. 5(b)), all
CSM immigrants will eventually become dominant populations. From the overall
trend, the higher the mobility, the greater the probability of movement, and the
higher the percentage of immigrant in the total population at equilibrium. It is
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worth noting that when the mobility is 4{the most active one, the immigrant
has a great probability of accounting for 100% of the total population.
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Fig. 5. Changes in immigrant population.
When the native strategy is CS and the immigrant strategy is CSM (Fig.
5(c)), the survival rate of immigrant is sharply reduced. With the increase in
mobility, the proportion of immigrant to the total population becomes lower at
equilibrium. When the mobility is the highest (4), the immigrant has a high
probability of dying.
To sum up, this experiment compares several collective strategies as the sur-
vivability of immigrant. When natives use ALLD or ALLC strategy, the higher
the mobility, the better the growth rate and the higher the nal population ratio.
However, in the unfavourable case - the natives use CS strategy, when the mo-
bility grows, the rate of population reduction is higher, and the nal proportion
of the population is lower, even extinct.
4 Conclusion
This paper has discussed the eects of collective strategy in spatial PD via
two series of experiments. We have analysed dierent results when adopting
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diverse strategies. The investigation shows that, comparing with immigrants
without collective behaviour, those with collective strategy have better survival
rate and a higher proportion of population in equilibrium. We have also studied
collective behaviours with dierent levels of mobility. The result suggests that
the mobility of CS has an inuence on the survival rate of immigrants. AllC and
AllD strategy of the native tends to accelerate the growth rate of immigrants,
while the population of immigrants declines and even extinct when the native
strategy is CS.
Although the current study is based on a small sample of experiments, it
shows the signicance of collective behaviour in strategic interactions. Dierent
settings of the game may have an inuence on the nal result. For example, the
initial population are set to 50% of the lattice, which might lead to a dierent
result if the value is changed. Further research will be conducted in the future
with dierent settings.
5 Appendix
Always Defect (AllD) Defect on every move.
Always Cooperate (AllC) Cooperate on every move.
Collective Strategy (CS) Cooperate with kin members and defect against
non-kin members.
Always Cooperate with Move (AllCM) Cooperate on every move. If there
exist kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of
eight neighboring empty places.
Always Defect with Move (AllDM) Defect on every move. If there exist
kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight
neighboring empty places.
Collective Strategy with Move (CSM) Cooperate with kin members and
defect against non-kin members. If there exist kin members in neighborhood,
then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
Collective Strategy with Move (CSM2) Cooperate with kin members and
defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 1 kin members in
neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring
empty places.
Collective Strategy with Move (CSM3) Cooperate with kin members and
defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 2 kin members in
neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring
empty places.
Collective Strategy with Move (CSM4) Cooperate with kin members and
defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 3 kin members in
neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring
empty places.
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